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I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2012, Sheila, a fifteen-year-old girl, was diagnosed with a 
rare and serious condition that, absent blood transfusions, would prove 
fatal.1  Sheila was also a practicing Jehovah’s Witness,2 a faith that bars 
receiving blood transfusions.3  Sheila’s parents did not consent to the 
 
1.  Dane Cnty. v. Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 42, 348 Wis. 2d 674, 835 N.W.2d 148 
(Gableman, J., dissenting).  Shelia was diagnosed with aplastic anemia.  Id.  Aplastic anemia 
occurs when the body stops producing a sufficient amount of new blood cells.  Mayo Clinic 
Staff, Diseases and Conditions: Aplastic Anemia, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/di
seases-conditions/aplastic-anemia/basics/definition/CON-20019296 (Mar. 18, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/MYP2-9CXT.  Sheila was given medication to attempt to treat the 
condition, but the medications were not effective, leaving blood transfusions as the only 
treatment option remaining.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 12 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
2.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 13 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
3.  R.T. Penson & P.C. Amrein, Faith and Freedom: Leukemia in Jehovah Witness 
Minors,  27  ONKOLOGIE  126,  126  (2004),  available  at  http://www.karger.com/Article/Pdf/7
6900, archived at http://perma.cc/Z2HY-4WXB.  Genesis 9:3–4, Leviticus 17:10–14, and Acts 
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transfusion, believing that Sheila was mature enough to make the 
decision for herself, and indicated that they would support Sheila’s 
decision either way.4  Sheila refused to consent to the transfusions based 
on her religious beliefs.5  Sheila expressed that she “would rather die not 
receiving the transfusions than survive, but have the stigma of having 
received a transfusion”; that a blood transfusion “would be ‘devastating 
to [her] mentally and physically’”; and that it is “[her] body, [her] belief, 
[her] wishes.”6  Underscoring how offensive Sheila considered blood 
transfusions, she expressed her belief that a transfusion is tantamount to 
“rape,”7 a not uncommon sentiment among Jehovah’s Witnesses.8 
Not persuaded by Sheila’s pleas, the county filed a petition for 
protection or services9 and a petition for temporary physical custody of 
Sheila.10  The circuit court held a hearing and appointed a temporary 
guardian11 with the power to consent to medical treatment for Sheila’s 
benefit.12  Sheila appealed the order appointing a temporary guardian,13 
but before the appeal was heard, the guardian consented to the 
recommended blood transfusions, Sheila’s affliction subsided, and the 
 
15:21–29 are Bible passages that prohibit the ingestion of blood and are the foundation for 
Jehovah’s Witness’ objection to blood transfusions.  Id. 
4.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 13 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
5.  Id. ¶ 14. 
6.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
8.  Rachel Olding, Jehovah’s Witness Teen Loses Appeal Over Life-Saving Transfusion, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 27, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/jehovah
s-witness-teen-loses-appeal-over-lifesaving-transfusion-20130927-2uib6.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P558-CTC (discussing an Australian Jehovah’s Witness teen’s objection to a 
blood transfusion and comparing it to rape). 
9.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 15 (Prosser, J., concurring); WIS. STAT. § 48.255 (2013–2014) 
(noting that, in certain circumstances, the court may find a child in need of protection or 
services). 
10.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 15 (Prosser, J., concurring); WIS. STAT. § 48.205(1)(b) 
(stating that custody may be granted if “[p]robable cause exists to believe that the parent, 
guardian or legal custodian of the child or other responsible adult is neglecting, refusing, 
unable or unavailable to provide adequate supervision and care and that services to ensure 
the child’s safety and well-being are not available or would be inadequate”). 
11.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 15 (Prosser, J., concurring); WIS. STAT. § 54.50 (“If it is 
demonstrated to the court that a proposed ward’s particular situation . . . requires the 
immediate appointment of a temporary guardian of the person or estate, the court may 
appoint a temporary guardian under this section.”). 
12.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 15 (Prosser, J., concurring); see WIS. STAT. § 54.50(2). 
13.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 2 (per curiam). 
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guardianship order expired.14  Due to the sequencing of events, the 
court of appeals held the matter to be moot.15  Sheila petitioned the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court for review.16 
Sheila requested Wisconsin’s high court recognize the mature minor 
doctrine.17  Under the mature minor doctrine, minors that exhibit the 
requisite level of maturity and understanding of the consequences of 
their actions are allowed to make independent medical treatment 
decisions.18  The petition for review was granted, the matters were 
briefed, and oral arguments were held.19  Inexplicably,20 the court issued 
a per curiam opinion21 in which it agreed with the conclusion of the 
court of appeals that the issue presented was moot and refused to decide 
the case on the merits.22 
Sheila W. provided the perfect canvas for the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court to lay out the state’s stance on the mature minor doctrine as it 
relates to the rights of minors to make their own medical treatment 
decisions.  Instead, the court chose to dodge the matter and leave it to 
the legislature to take up at its leisure.23  The court’s approach, while 
convenient and deferential, is most aptly described by the dissent in 
Sheila W. as “abdication dressed as modesty.”24  The court’s legislature-
centric stance regarding recognition of a mature minor doctrine fails to 
recognize one reality and completely ignores another. 
 
14.  See id. ¶ 15 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
15.  Id. ¶ 2 (per curiam); id. ¶ 15 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
16.  See id. ¶ 1 (per curiam). 
17.  Id. ¶ 16 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
18.  Id. (quoting FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
§ 5.01[B][3], at 5-10 (4th ed. 2007)). 
19.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63. 
20.  I say inexplicably because the per curiam opinion states that the case “undoubtedly 
presents issues of great public importance” and presents an issue that is “capable and likely of 
repetition and yet will evade appellate review.”  Id. ¶ 7 (per curiam).  Thus, according to the 
per curiam opinion, the case represents two of the recognized situations that are exceptions to 
mootness.  Id. ¶ 6. 
21.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63.  A concurrence was filed by Justice Prosser, and a dissent 
was filed by Justice Gableman and joined by Justices Roggensack and Ziegler. 
22.  See id. ¶ 24 (Prosser, J., concurring) (agreeing the matter is moot but discussing the 
preference that such matters of “profoundly important policy determinations about the rights 
of minors” should be left to the legislature). 
23.  Id. ¶ 8 (per curiam) (stating that the legislature is better situated to address such 
public policy questions). 
24.  Id. ¶ 53 (Gableman, J., dissenting). 
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First, the court referenced a prior decision in which the same “defer 
to the legislature” rationale was used,25 but as the dissent pointed out, 
the per curiam opinion failed to mention that the legislature took 
twenty-five years to address the matter at issue.26  Further, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ numbers are not so great27 and their beliefs not so 
mainstream as to engender sympathy among the masses that could lead 
to a groundswell of support spurring legislative action.  The dissent in 
the case cited by the per curiam opinion sums up this flaw nicely: 
“[A]part from any aversion legislators may have to addressing a 
controversial question, there is the added practical problem of the press 
of legislative business.  The thousands of problems presented to the 
legislature tax its ability to respond thoughtfully to the multiple 
problems of society.”28  The court’s message-in-a-bottle to the 
legislature requesting rescue and clarification on this issue will likely 
bob around aimlessly at sea for decades before perhaps washing up on 
the shores of the legislature’s to-do list many years from now.  In the 
meantime, cases will come before courts in this state where an 
articulated stance on the mature minor doctrine would be at worst 
helpful guidance and at best dispositive to the matters before them.29 
Second, whether to recognize the mature minor doctrine is more 
than a simple policy question akin to states making the choice whether 
to adopt comparative or contributory negligence in tort matters.  The 
mature minor doctrine concerns rights of constitutional magnitude, and 
it is exactly the court’s place to speak to them.30  A minor’s 
constitutional rights to due process, bodily integrity, and, in Sheila’s 
 
25.  Id. ¶ 8 (per curiam) (citing Eberhardy v. Circuit Court for Wood Cnty., 102 Wis. 2d 
539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981)). 
26.  Id. ¶ 51 (Gableman, J., dissenting). 
27.  In 2012, less than 0.4% of the U.S. population were considered practicing Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (with 1,156,150 practicing individuals out of the U.S. population of 315,800,438).  
United States Jehovah’s Witness Publisher Statistics, JWFACTS.COM, (last visited Jan. 25, 
2015), http://www.jwfacts.com/statistics/charts/us/statistics-watchtower-us.pdf, archived at http
://perma.cc/KGA3-JDJ3. 
28.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 51 (Gableman, J., dissenting) (quoting Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 
2d at 605 (Callow, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
29.  See id. ¶ 52 (pointing out that without any standard put forth by the high court, 
lower courts have no guidance in like situations that will come before them).  
30.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(“A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law.  It 
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular 
act proceeding from the legislative body.”). 
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case, religious freedom are implicated when a minor asserts her wishes 
to make her own medical treatment decisions.  It is axiomatic that state 
legislatures are not the gatekeepers to constitutional rights.31  For 
legislative action that implicates constitutional rights, the courts are 
unquestionably the final arbiters of its constitutionality.32  A court may 
find legislative action either constitutional or unconstitutional, but it is a 
novel stance indeed to suggest that the legislature, and the legislature 
alone, determine whether certain classes of citizens enjoy fundamental 
constitutional rights.  If the court remains silent on this matter and 
evades the question while at the same time prodding the legislature to 
make its stance known, it is ceding its authority and skirting its duty to 
delineate the reach and limits of constitutional rights in this state.  While 
the legislature ruminates (or more likely does not) over whether mature 
minors should be able to make their own medical treatment decisions, 
the question of to what degree, if at all, minors possess due process, 
bodily integrity, and religious liberty rights in this area remains without 
reply or input from the state’s highest court.   
This Comment proposes that Wisconsin courts recognize the mature 
minor doctrine in the context of medical treatment decisions so it can be 
considered in cases where minors of sufficient age and maturity who 
demonstrate the ability to understand and accept the consequences of 
their decisions are allowed to make independent medical treatment 
decisions.  Adopting the doctrine would ensure a measure of consistency 
in Wisconsin law when it comes to treatment of minors, especially when 
such treatment concerns constitutional rights.  In addition, acceptance of 
the doctrine would further validate and exemplify Wisconsin’s history of 
religious liberty protection enshrined in its constitution.33 
 
31.  Id. at 393 (“[E]very act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the 
commission under which it is exercised, is void.  No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the 
Constitution, can be valid.”). 
32.  See, e.g., Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations Corp., 2012 WI 88, ¶ 105 & n.9, 342 
Wis. 2d 626, 819 N.W.2d 264 (Roggensack, Ziegler & Gableman, JJ., concurring) (citing State 
v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶ 172, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110) (Roggensack, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part); State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25, ¶ 69, 332 Wis. 2d 620, 796 
N.W.2d 741 (Abrahamson, C.J., & Bradley, J., concurring). 
33.  WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“The right of every person to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be 
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, 
without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be 
permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of 
worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, 
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The mature minor doctrine is not a complicated concept.  Simply 
put, it posits that at some point some minors are mature enough to make 
their own decisions when it comes to medical treatment, and those 
decisions should be respected and followed.34  As easy as the concept is 
to understand, the matters to be considered in the adoption and defense 
of the doctrine are vast and disparate.  This Comment will confine the 
argument for the adoption of the mature minor doctrine in Wisconsin to 
what are the most important and compelling justifications for its 
recognition.  Part I contains an overview of the mature minor doctrine, 
including a brief survey of jurisdictions that have recognized it.  Part II 
examines the rights implicated by the doctrine, constitutional 
jurisprudence regarding those rights, and whether the identified 
constitutional rights are generally applicable to minors.  Part III 
provides the basis for recognition of the mature minor doctrine in 
Wisconsin as a logical and consistent conclusion based upon the state’s 
current treatment of minors and their rights in other areas of the law.  
Part IV argues for the adoption of the mature minor doctrine by 
exposing the inconsistencies present, absent formal recognition. 
II. MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE OVERVIEW AND RECOGNITION 
The mature minor doctrine is a common law concept35 and is 
recognized as a “definite exception” to the general rule that requires 
parental consent for treatment of a minor.36  Some states have codified a 
form of the mature minor doctrine,37 while others have adopted it via 
 
or religious or theological seminaries.”). 
34.  See ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 5.01[B][3], at 5-10. 
35.  Id. § 5.01[B], at 5-7 (Supp. 2014). 
36.  Cf. ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 5.01[A], at 5-5 to -6 (Supp. 2010) (“The restrictions 
on minors under traditional common law principles reflect the opinion that they were deemed 
incapable of exercising sufficient judgment.  Similarly, the law has traditionally viewed minors 
as being incapable of executing contracts except those for necessaries.  Because the 
physician–patient relationship often is viewed as being contractual in nature, the inability of a 
minor to execute binding contracts strengthened the traditional argument that a minor was 
incapable of giving valid consent.  The logical conclusion was that the authority to consent to 
medical treatment on a minor’s behalf must be vested in someone else.  That power has 
developed to the natural guardians of the minor—his or her parents.”); Walter Wadlington, 
Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 
1994 U. ILL L. REV. 311, 314; Shellie K. Park, Comment, Severing the Bond of Life: When 
Conflicts of Interest Fail to Recognize the Value of Two Lives, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 157, 166 
(2002). 
37.  Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶ 18 (Prosser, J., concurring) (identifying Arkansas, New 
Mexico, South Carolina, and Virginia as states that have adopted some form of the mature 
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judicial decision.38  Because of the subjective nature of maturity, the 
factors that make a minor “mature” for the purposes of the mature 
minor doctrine vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.39  Whether by 
statute or judicial determination, states that have adopted a form of the 
mature minor doctrine have a process in place to allow a minor who 
displays the “sufficient understanding . . . of the nature and 
consequences of treatment despite their chronological age” to make 
their own medical treatment decisions.40  In other words, the doctrine 
recognizes that in certain situations “[a]lthough they are chronologically 
still children, . . . medical conditions have . . . jolted them into 
adulthood.”41 
Jurisdictions that have adopted some form of the doctrine have 
recognized that, in certain instances regarding medical treatment of 
minors, the age of the minor patient does not automatically preclude the 
patient from the treatment decision process.  Different jurisdictions 
approach the matter in their own ways.  The Tennessee Supreme Court 
adopted the Rule of Sevens, which posits that a child under seven 
should “rarely, if ever” be medically treated without parental consent, a 
child from age seven to fourteen has a rebuttable presumption of no 
capacity regarding medical treatment decisions, and a child fourteen and 
older has a presumption of capacity to participate in his or her own 
medical treatment decisions.42  Virginia has a statute allowing a 
“sufficiently mature” child of fourteen or older to refuse medical 
treatment if other conditions are satisfied.43  New Mexico’s statute is not 
age restricted and provides that a minor that “has capacity sufficient to 
understand the nature of . . . [the] medical condition [and] the risks and 
benefits of the treatment . . . shall have the authority to withhold or 
 
minor doctrine via statute). 
38.  Id. ¶ 20 (identifying Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia as states that have adopted some form of the mature minor 
doctrine via judicial action). 
39.  See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
40.  ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 5.01[B][3], at 5-10. 
41.  Id. § 5.09[C], at 5-134 (Supp. 2013). 
42.  Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745, 748–49 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that, guided 
by the Rule of Sevens, a seventeen-year-old minor had the maturity to consent to medical 
treatment). 
43.  VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100.2 (2012) (stating that if a decision is made jointly with 
the parents, other treatment options have been considered, and the parents have a good-faith 
belief that the decision is in the best interests of the child, a sufficiently mature child age 
fourteen and older will have his or her medical treatment decisions followed). 
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withdraw life-sustaining treatment.”44  However each individual state 
has chosen to recognize the mature minor doctrine, underlying its 
recognition is the premise that a bright-line age of majority rule for 
consent to medical treatment in all circumstances is unappealing and 
unjustified. 
It is important to note that the mature minor doctrine does not 
automatically lower the age of consent within any given jurisdiction and 
is not centrally fixated on the age of the minor involved.  The 
applicability of the doctrine “necessarily involves a case-by-case analysis 
to determine” the minor patient’s maturity in light of the case-specific 
situation.45  As such, a fifteen-year-old may be found to possess the 
requisite amount of maturity in one case, while a seventeen-year-old’s 
maturity may be found deficient in another.46  Such a fact-specific, case-
by-case inquiry demonstrates that “age and maturity of the minor 
patient” are to be considered jointly in determining a minor’s maturity 
in a given situation.47 
If a minor is adjudged to possess the required amount of maturity to 
make his or her own medical decisions, that right is not absolute.48  The 
right to refuse treatment must be balanced against the recognized state 
interests of “(1) preserving life; (2) safeguarding the integrity of the 
medical profession; (3) preventing suicide; and (4) protecting innocent 
third parties.”49  In addition, even if a minor is adjudged to be mature 
enough to make his or her own medical treatment decisions, the views 
of the parents are not completely discounted.50  In the case of a mature 
minor, “if the desires of the parents are aligned with those of the mature 
minor, the decision is easier for courts faced with a determination to 
refuse potentially life-saving care.”51 
 
44.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-6.1.C (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2013). 
45.  ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 5.09[C], at 5-132 (Supp. 2013). 
46.  See id. at 5-132, 5-136 (Supp. 2013). 
47.  Id. at 5-133 (Supp. 2013) (emphasis in original). 
48.  See id. at 5-132 (Supp. 2013). 
49.  Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 90, 482 N.W.2d 60, 74 (1992) 
(citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985)). 
50.  In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 323, 328 (Ill. 1989) (reasoning that if the parents opposed 
a seventeen-year-old minor’s opposition to blood transfusions for treatment for leukemia on 
religious grounds, that fact would “weigh heavily” on the minor’s right to make the decision 
to forego treatment.).  
51.  ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 5.09[C], at 5-134 (Supp. 2013). 
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III. THE RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE  
The right to make one’s own medical treatment decisions has been 
given constitutional weight.  From forced sterilization52 to the ability to 
refuse life-saving treatment,53 the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
that such treatment decisions implicate fundamental constitutional 
rights.54  To the point, the Court has “assumed, and strongly suggested, 
that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse 
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”55  In addition, when a patient 
makes a treatment decision based on a sincerely held religious belief, 
the patient’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment must be considered.56     
In Wisconsin, the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is 
found in “the common law right of self-determination . . . , the personal 
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and from the 
guarantee of liberty in Article I, section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.”57  The rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution act as a 
floor rather than a ceiling, and states are free to extend rights to their 
citizens beyond what the U.S. Supreme Court has held to be the outer 
limits of federal constitutional protection.58  For the purposes of the 
mature minor doctrine, this Comment makes no distinction between 
Wisconsin and federal constitutional protections in the area of 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.  However, in situations that 
demand an examination of an individual’s Free Exercise rights, it is 
plain to see that Wisconsin has chosen to broaden its citizens’ Free 
Exercise rights beyond those afforded by the federal system.59  
 
52.  Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
53.  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The principle that a 
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”) 
54.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting that refusing 
medical treatment implicates the Due Process Clause). 
55.  Id. 
56.  In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 549 
N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989) (placing emphasis on the minor’s right of freedom of religion as the 
basis for refusing medical treatment). 
57.  Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 67, 482 N.W.2d 60, 65 (1992). 
58.  See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 
489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (reasoning that the states have the 
power to impose higher standards for government restrictions on citizens than those required 
by the federal Constitution).  
59.  See WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
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There is controversy regarding if, when, how, and which 
constitutional rights exist in the context of minors.60  In Washington v. 
Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed “the traditional right to 
refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment” with the caveat that the 
person enforcing the right is competent.61  Generally speaking, minors 
are not considered competent,62 but there is precedential basis to 
consider treating minors as competent when constitutional rights are 
being infringed upon by the state.63  On more than one occasion, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has stated constitutional rights exist for minors: 
“Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone”;64 “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being 
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.  
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess 
constitutional rights.”65  Minors have been found to possess 
constitutional rights in the following areas: procedural due process in 
court proceedings,66 procuring an abortion,67 the right to free speech,68 
the right to exercise religion,69 protection from unreasonable searches,70 
 
60.  Compare supra notes 56–59, and infra notes 61–72 and accompanying text, with 
infra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
61.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990)). 
62.  See supra note 36. 
63.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976) 
(noting that “the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to become 
pregnant” cannot be eclipsed by the parents’ interest in terminating her pregnancy absent a 
sufficiently compelling state interest). 
64.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1967) (referencing other decisions that indicate 
minors have access to constitutional protections). 
65.  Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
66.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33–34 (“Due process of law requires notice of the sort we 
have described—that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or 
criminal proceeding.  It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth’s freedom and 
his parents’ right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of 
the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet.”). 
67.  Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (holding minors’ access to abortion cannot be restricted 
without requisite justification). 
68.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (“The 
Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free speech.  
This provision means what it says.  We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of 
speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances.  But we do not confine the 
permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a 
pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.”). 
69.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (holding a statute 
that compelled salutating the flag was unconstitutional).  A concurrence stated, “We believe 
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and the right to substantive due process.71  Also, perhaps most notably, 
the Court has recognized minors’ equal protection claims on par with 
those of adults.72   
The unqualified nature of the statements confirming the existence of 
constitutional protections for minors and the supporting case law 
notwithstanding, a minor’s constitutional rights have been found to be 
less than those of adults in a number of circumstances: the right to 
travel,73 the right to privacy,74 the right to a trial by jury,75 and the right 
to freedom of speech.76  Representative of the conclusions in these 
diminished rights cases is a simple and straightforward statement of the 
Court: “[U]nemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental 
rights of self-determination . . . .”77  As with the preceding paragraph, 
there is precedential basis to treat a minor’s constitutional rights as less 
than those of adults when a claim is made that a right is being violated.78 
 
that the statute before us fails to accord full scope to the freedom of religion secured to the 
appellees by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”  Id. at 643 (Black & Douglas, JJ., 
concurring). 
70.  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 365 (2009) (syllabus) 
(“Under the resulting reasonable suspicion standard, a school search ‘will be permissible . . . 
when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction.’” (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985))).  
71.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (noting that the Court had previously held 
that “children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process”). 
72.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of 
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.  Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.  Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation 
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
73.  Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]he First 
Amendment defense by definition provides full protection, [so] any residual deterrent caused 
by the curfew would pose at most an incidental burden on juveniles’ expressive activity or 
rights of association.”). 
74.  Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995) (“Taking into account 
all the factors we have considered above—the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative 
unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search—we conclude 
Vernonia’s Policy is reasonable and hence constitutional.”). 
75.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (“[T]rial by jury in the juvenile 
court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.”). 
76.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“A school need not 
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission.’” (quoting 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986))). 
77.  Veronia, 515 U.S. at 654.  
78.  See supra notes 61–72 and accompanying text. 
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IV. BASIS FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE 
The Wisconsin legislature has chosen not to address the mature 
minor doctrine as it relates to consent for medical treatment decisions.79  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has chosen the same path.80  This lack of 
attention should not be construed as rejection of the doctrine because 
common law concepts often escape legislative and judicial review.  
Examined in the context of medical treatment decisions, Wisconsin 
statutory law, the persuasive reasoning of other authorities and 
jurisdictions, and the individual constitutional protections guaranteed by 
the Wisconsin and U.S. Constitutions seem to logically mandate 
recognition of the mature minor doctrine for medical treatment 
decisions in Wisconsin. 
A. Existing State Law   
To say Wisconsin does not recognize the mature minor doctrine is 
not entirely accurate.  Wisconsin currently recognizes certain classes of 
minors and affords them atypical treatment in some areas of medical 
consent.81  Those under the age of majority in Wisconsin are allowed to 
access contraceptive care,82 obtain pregnancy tests and obstetrical 
healthcare or screening,83 be tested and treated for sexually transmitted 
diseases,84 procure an abortion,85 obtain drug and alcohol treatment,86 
 
79.  See Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, 348 Wis. 2d 674, 835 N.W.2d 148. 
80.  Id. 
81.  See infra notes 82–91 and accompanying text. 
82.  Wisconsin does not have a statute specifically authorizing access to contraception.  
However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth 
held that reproductive privacy is a protected right under the U.S. Constitution and cannot be 
denied solely as the result of age.  See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 74–75 (1976); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (“Since the 
State may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of parental 
consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a 
blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed.”). 
83.  See supra note 82. 
84.  WIS. STAT. § 252.11(1m) (2013–2014) (“A physician may treat a minor infected with 
a sexually transmitted disease or examine and diagnose a minor for the presence of such a 
disease without obtaining the consent of the minor’s parents or guardian.”). 
85.  Wisconsin law allows an emancipated minor to procure an abortion.  Id. 
§ 48.375(7)(c)(1).  According to the statute, 
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control the release of mental health records,87 make decisions for a child 
if the mother is a minor,88 donate bone marrow,89 donate blood,90 and 
make a decision to donate an anatomical gift after death.91  Beyond the 
medical consent realm, Wisconsin will treat a minor as an adult if the 
minor is married,92 is enrolled in the military,93 has committed a certain 
type of crime,94 or has committed any crime at all if older than 
 
“Emancipated minor” means a minor who is or has been married; a minor who has 
previously given birth; or a minor who has been freed from the care, custody and 
control of her parents, with little likelihood of returning to the care, custody and 
control prior to marriage or prior to reaching the age of majority. 
Id. § 48.375(2)(e). 
86.  Id. § 51.47(1) (“[A]ny physician or health care facility licensed, approved, or 
certified by the state for the provision of health services may render preventive, diagnostic, 
assessment, evaluation, or treatment services for the abuse of alcohol or other drugs to a 
minor 12 years of age or over without obtaining the consent of or notifying the minor’s parent 
or guardian . . . .”). 
87.  Id. § 51.30(5)(a)–(b) (“A minor who is aged 14 or more may consent to the release 
of confidential information in court or treatment records without the consent of the minor’s 
parent, guardian or person in the place of a parent . . . .  The parent, guardian or person in the 
place of a parent of a developmentally disabled minor shall have access to the minor’s court 
and treatment records at all times except in the case of a minor aged 14 or older who files a 
written objection to such access with the custodian of the records.”). 
88.  See ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 5.02[A][6], at 5-27 to -28 (“[T]he law of consent 
imposes no prohibition on consent by a minor parent, . . . [but] in the absence of such 
legislation, it would seem legally incorrect to require consent from a minor parent’s father or 
mother or from the youthful parent’s adult sister or brother. . . .  The better approach in the 
absence of legislation is to obtain consent to treatment from the minor parent.  Such a policy 
is in keeping with the longstanding common law rule that a parent must consent to care for 
his or her unemancipated child.”).  
89.  WIS. STAT. § 146.34(4)(a) (“A minor who has attained the age of 12 years may, if 
the medical condition of a brother or sister of the minor requires that the brother or sister 
receive a bone marrow transplant, give written consent to be a donor if . . . [certain conditions 
are met].”). 
90.  Id. § 146.33 (“Any person who is 17 years old or older may donate blood in any 
voluntary and noncompensatory blood program . . . .”). 
91.  Id. § 157.06(4)(a) (noting that a donor who is at least fifteen-and-one-half years of 
age may make the decision to make a posthumous anatomical gift). 
92.  Id. § 765.02(2) (stating that a minor aged sixteen or greater may obtain a marriage 
license with parental consent); La Crosse Cnty. v. Vernon Cnty., 233 Wis. 664, 666, 290 N.W. 
279, 280 (1940) (stating that marriage emancipates a minor). 
93.  See Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 602, 157 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1968) (recognizing 
that joining the military can be an act of self-emancipation). 
94.  WIS. STAT. § 938.18(1) (stating that minors as young as fourteen can be charged as 
adults if certain crimes have been committed). 
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seventeen.95  In addition, Wisconsin law calls for what can be described 
as maturity hearings in cases of bone marrow donation96 and judicial 
waiver for parental consent to an abortion.97  In Wisconsin, it appears 
that the question is not if a minor will be afforded, or subjected to, age 
of majority treatment but rather when and under what circumstances. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared the right of bodily integrity to 
be the most “sacred” common law right,98 and the Tennessee Supreme 
Court has recognized that minors “achieve varying degrees of maturity 
and responsibility” as they grow older.99  It only stands to reason that, as 
a minor achieves greater degrees of maturity, the minor’s ability to 
exercise the most “sacred” of common law rights is more readily 
recognized.  One court has indicated it would be antithetical to conclude 
otherwise.100 
As stated above, Wisconsin already subjectively employs the 
mechanisms of the mature minor doctrine and has recognized this 
“sacred right” in the context of minors—in certain instances, those 
under the age of majority are considered sufficiently mature (sometimes 
determined by a hearing or expert testimony) and are afforded rights 
and protections of competent adults despite their chronological age.101  
While all treatment decisions, considerations, state interests, and 
 
95.  Id. § 938.02(10m) (“‘Juvenile’, when used without further qualification, means a 
person who is less than 18 years of age, except that for purposes of investigating or 
prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a state or federal criminal law or any civil 
law or municipal ordinance, ‘juvenile’ does not include a person who has attained 17 years of 
age.”). 
96.  Id. § 146.34(4)(b) (noting that minors who attain the age of twelve may donate bone 
marrow if a psychiatrist or psychologist has determined the minor has attained the requisite 
level of maturity to make such a decision). 
97.  Id. § 48.375(7)(c)(1) (recognizing that a petition for judicial procedure to bypass the 
parental consent requirement to obtain an abortion will be granted if the court determines 
“[t]hat the minor is mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on her 
own”). 
98.  Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to 
the possession and control of his own person . . . .”). 
99.  Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744–45 (Tenn. 1987) (“[R]ecognition that 
minors achieve varying degrees of maturity and responsibility (capacity) has been part of the 
common law for well over a century.”). 
100.  Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 837 (W. Va. 1992) (“It is 
difficult to imagine that a young person who is under the age of majority, yet, who has 
undergone medical treatment for a permanent or recurring illness over the course of a long 
period of time, may not be capable of taking part in decisions concerning that treatment.”). 
101.  See supra notes 82–97 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances in the situations mentioned above no doubt are 
distinguishable from a situation like Sheila’s, the fact that Wisconsin 
evidences a historical willingness to consider the age and maturity of a 
minor in light of a specific situation argues for a mature minor doctrine 
in the area of refusal of medical treatment, especially on religious 
grounds.102 
B. Other Jurisdictions and Persuasive Authority 
Obviously, Wisconsin’s legislature and judiciary are not bound by 
the policy decisions or judicial opinions of other states.  However, it is 
worth noting that a number of states have recognized the doctrine in the 
context of refusing medical treatment, and no state has expressly 
rejected its application when a minor wished to forego lifesaving 
medical treatment.103  In addition, the foremost treatise on the subject104 
and the professional associations whose members are intimately 
involved with minor patients already assign great weight to the minor’s 
wishes regarding treatment.105 
A number of state courts have recognized the mature minor 
doctrine,106 and others have indicated that, should it come before them, 
they would recognize it as well.107  Other states have had cases that have 
not explicitly affirmed the mature minor doctrine but have recognized a 
 
102.  See supra Part IV.C.2. 
103.  While individual mature minor doctrine claims have been rejected in some 
jurisdictions, the basis of the rejection was either a lack of sufficient maturity on the part of 
the individual making the claim or a general absence of state authority upon which to make 
the claim.  The doctrine itself has not been rejected.  See In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 
557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. App. 
1990); Novak v. Cobb Cnty.Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1576 (N.D. Ga. 
1994). 
104.  ROZOVSKY, supra note 18. 
105.  See infra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
106.  See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Ill. 1989); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. 
of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 338 (Kan. 1970); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205–06 (Me. 
1990); In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999); Bakker v. Welsh, 108 N.W. 
94, 96 (Mich. 1906); Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co. v. Sullivan, 119 So. 501, 502 (Miss. 1928); 
Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748–49 (Tenn. 1987); Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. 
Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 837–38 (W. Va. 1992). 
107.  In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972) (reasoning that a mature minor’s wishes 
should be taken into account in the context of a parent’s withholding of medical treatment for 
minor); State v. Koome, 530 P.2d 260, 266–67 (Wash. 1975) (recognizing that competency and 
maturity are relevant to a minor’s right to consent). 
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minor’s right to refuse treatment.108  Still others have enacted statutes 
codifying the doctrine.109  Of the cases addressing the doctrine, In re 
E.G.110 from the Illinois Supreme Court is most analogous to Sheila’s 
situation.  In re E.G. involved a seventeen-year-old Jehovah’s Witness 
who “would likely die within a month” without blood transfusions that 
both E.G. and her parent refused.111  The Illinois Supreme Court could 
see “no reason” why the common law “right of dominion over one’s 
own person should not extend to mature minors.”112  The court also 
found that the state’s interest in protecting children was valid, but that 
interest decreased as the age and maturity of the minor increased.113  
The court also implied that the decision to respect E.G.’s decision was 
made easier due to the fact that she and her mother were unified in the 
decision.114 
Scholarly commentary and professional associations also support 
recognition of the doctrine.  A widely cited treatise on the issue of 
treatment consent also documents the growing recognition of the 
mature minor doctrine.115  As the number of jurisdictions that recognize 
the mature minor doctrine grows, “there seems to be little justification 
for compelling treatment in cases involving minors.”116  The treatise goes 
on to counsel that “[t]he physician is treating the minor—not the 
 
108.  Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge’s Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child’s Capacity to 
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1893–94 (1996) (discussing two California cases in which 
trial courts allowed a minor to refuse medical treatment); Chistine Gorman, A Sick Boy Says 
“Enough!,” TIME, June 27, 1994, at 65, 65 (discussing a Florida court’s finding that a fifteen-
year-old is mature enough to understand the fatal consequences of his decisions to refuse 
continued medical treatment after a liver transplant). 
109.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (2005 & Supp. 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 24-7A-6.1.C (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2013); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-340 (2010); see 
also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241.W (2010 & Supp. 2012) (recognizing a minor’s ability to 
petition the court to procure an abortion).  
110.  In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989). 
111.  Id. at 323. 
112.  Id. at 326. 
113.  Id. at 327. 
114.  See id. at 328. 
115.  See ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, §§ 5.01–.02.  The publisher notes the treatise has 
been cited by more than twenty court decisions, including the U.S. Supreme Court, and over 
ninety law review articles.  Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide, Fourth Edition, 
WOLTERS KLUWER L. & BUS. (last visited Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.wklawbusiness.com/stor
e/products/consent-treatment-practical-guide-fifth-prod-1454843039/looseleaf-item-1-1454843
039; archived at http://perma.cc/7MWT-6R5H. 
116.  ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 5.09[C], at 5-135 (Supp. 2013). 
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parents—and a reasonable refusal on the minor’s part should be 
heeded.”117  Those responsible for the treatment of minors accept these 
presumptions.  The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the 
Midwest Bioethics Center (MBC) have released policy statements 
directly on point.118  The AAP has noted, “[A]dolescents, especially 
those age 14 and older, may have as well developed decisional skills as 
adults for making informed healthcare decisions.”119  The AAP takes the 
clear position that “[i]n cases involving . . . mature minors with adequate 
decision-making capacity, . . . physicians should seek informed consent 
directly from the patients.”120  The MBC policy statement is in accord: 
“[M]inors with decisional capacity should be allowed to make treatment 
decisions including refusal of treatment . . . .”121  Finally, there is support 
for the proposition that a plurality of doctors believe that, regarding 
treatment of minors, it is their “ethical obligation to honor an adolescent 
patient’s decision” rather than defer to the parent’s decision in the 
matter.122 
As illustrated above, the maturity of minors in the context of 
medical treatment is already a reality in many jurisdictions and is often 
an assumed course of conduct within the medical profession.123  The 
doctrine at issue here is not an obscure and mysterious tenet of a bygone 
era but rather a contemporary and widely sanctioned recognition of 
what law and society already know—as children get older they become 
more mature and are afforded greater responsibility in the direction of 
their own lives.  Wisconsin knows and accepts this as well, but its failure 
 
117.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
118.  MIDWEST BIOETHICS CTR. TASK FORCE ON HEALTH CARE RIGHTS FOR 
MINORS, HEALTH CARE TREATMENT DECISION-MAKING GUIDELINES FOR MINORS, 
BIOETHICS FORUM (1995), available at http://www.practicalbioethics.org/files/member/docum
ents/Guidelines_11_4.pdf [hereinafter MIDWEST BIOETHICS CTR.]; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics 
Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 
95 PEDIATRICS 314 (1995), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/95/2/314.f
ull.pdf+html, archived at http://perma.cc/UMY9-ZSD3 [hereinafter Informed Consent]. 
119.  Informed Consent, supra note 118, at 317. 
120.  Id. 
121.  MIDWEST BIOETHICS CTR., supra note 118, at A/12. 
122.  Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care: 
Physician Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 119 (2001) (“39.9 
percent (n=69) agreed with [the proposition that the law should allow mature minors to make 
their own healthcare decisions], 30.7 percent (n=53) disagreed, and 24.9 percent (n=43) were 
undecided.”). 
123.  See supra notes 106–14, 118–22 and accompanying text. 
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to fully examine or even consider this truism in the context of minors 
and medical treatment decisions—essentially pretending it does not 
exist, regardless of all the reason and support for it—is a case study in 
willful blindness. 
C. Constitutional Considerations 
Failure to consider the mature minor doctrine necessitates the need 
for a constitutional rights analysis.124  This is especially true when the 
decision is based on sincerely held religious convictions.125  Both the 
U.S. Constitution and the Wisconsin constitution protect the right to 
refuse unwanted medical treatment126 and the right to free exercise of 
religion.127  As discussed previously, the examination of constitutional 
rights in the context of minors has yielded conflicting and confusing 
results.128  Nevertheless, a survey of the application of applicable rights 
to minors in the medical treatment context and the right to religious 
liberty clearly argue for adoption of the mature minor doctrine in 
Wisconsin. 
1. Due Process 
A mature minor’s right to make his or her own medical treatment 
decisions, including refusal of lifesaving treatment, should be as 
 
124.  See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill. 1989) (reasoning that constitutional 
analysis unnecessary because the court recognized a minor’s common law right to refuse 
medical treatment).  It is reasonable to assume that if the common law right was not 
conferred, the court would engage in a constitutional analysis.  
125.  In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 549 
N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989) (placing emphasis on the minor’s right of freedom of religion as the 
basis for refusing medical treatment).  
126.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“We have . . . assumed, and 
strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse 
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”); Lenz v. L.E. Phillips Career Dev. Ctr., 167 Wis. 2d 
53, 67, 482 N.W.2d 60, 65 (1992) (finding the right to refuse medical treatment exists in the 
Due Process Clause and the Wisconsin constitution, article I, § 1). 
127.  U.S. CONST. amend. I, (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there of . . . .”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 (“The 
right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience shall 
never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of 
worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference 
with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious 
establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the 
benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.”). 
128.  See supra Part III. 
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constitutionally justified as a mature minor’s right to procure an 
abortion.129  If one is constitutionally protected, so must be the other.  A 
brief survey of the relevant case law reveals the foundation for this 
proposition.  The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that in the context of 
abortion minors can be considered competent.130  In the context of 
abortion, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated the following: (1) it is 
unconstitutional for a statute to allow withholding of judicial 
authorization from a minor that was found to be “mature and fully 
competent” to make the decision to have an abortion;131 (2) it is 
unconstitutional to disregard “the abortion decision of a minor who has 
been determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the 
implications of the choice she has made”;132 (3) where a minor “satisfies 
a court that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully informed 
decision, she then is entitled to make her abortion decision 
independently”;133 (4) a state cannot make a “blanket determination” 
that anyone under a certain age is unable to make the abortion decision 
independently;134 and (5) denial of the right to abortion cannot be based 
solely on the basis of chronological age, and a case-by-case assessment 
of maturity is required.135  Taken together, these statements make clear 
that the right to an abortion materializes when the person seeking the 
procedure is found to be mature enough to make such a decision.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has further justified this stance by reasoning that 
states may restrict a number of activities based on chronological age, 
even those that have constitutional protections associated with them, 
because the rights are merely “postponed.”136  However, the Court 
reasoned that, in the case of abortion, a minor who is prohibited from 
 
129.  See In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 290. 
130.  See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).  
131.  Id. at 651. 
132.  Id. at 650. 
133.  Id. 
134.  City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440 (1983) 
(“[The state] may not make a blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15 are 
too immature to make this decision or that an abortion never may be in the minor’s best 
interests without parental approval.”), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
135.  See id. at 439–40 (noting prior jurisprudence calls for a case-by-case determination 
of a minor’s maturity to make the decision to have an abortion). 
136.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642–43 (“[T]he abortion decision is one that simply cannot 
be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching consequences.”). 
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obtaining one has lost that right permanently.137 
If the mature minor enjoys some constitutional protections in regard 
to procuring an abortion, there is no reasonable basis for failing to 
confer a similarly justified constitutional protection to the mature minor 
who wishes to refuse medical treatment.  After all, the right to an 
abortion does not exist in the text of the Constitution or in a vacuum; it 
is based upon general notions of due process and bodily integrity.138  A 
minor who is unable to refuse medical treatment suffers loss of due 
process and bodily integrity the same as a minor who is unable to obtain 
an abortion.  A minor who is unable to refuse medical treatment is 
foreclosed from that right permanently the same as a minor who is 
denied an abortion.  There is little daylight between the interests, 
reasoning, and justifications underlying the right of mature minors to 
obtain an abortion and the right to make their own medical treatment 
decisions.  However, the difference in recognition is profound and 
exposes the intellectual dishonesty of those who support minors’ 
abortion rights while also supporting limits on when minors can make 
life-or-death decisions outside of the procreation realm and allowing 
medical treatment rights for similarly situated mature minors to “come 
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of 
majority.”139  The Jehovah’s Witnesses may not have the politically 
connected lobby needed to effectuate change through the legislature, 
but their religious beliefs should not be marginalized and dismissed out 
of hand while pretending that what they seek to have recognized is not 
available in this state when, in reality, it appears it is reserved only for 
those with the right kind of “affliction.”140 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R. noted that “[m]ost 
children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound 
judgments . . . , including their need for medical care or treatment.”141  
This statement does not foreclose recognition of the constitutional right 
of mature minors to make their own medical treatment decisions; in 
 
137.  Id. 
138.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (noting that Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was grounded in due process protections as well as “personal 
autonomy and bodily integrity”). 
139.  Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (showing the 
illogical nature of withholding recognized rights until one attains the “magical” age 
determined by the state).  
140.  See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text. 
141.  442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
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fact, it argues in favor of it.  If “most children” are incapable of making 
such decisions, it stands to reason that some children are.  That is the 
very point of the mature minor doctrine—to determine if a given minor, 
in a given situation, has the requisite maturity to make his or her own 
medical treatment decision.142  The logical conclusion drawn from 
statements such as the one the Court made in Parham is that there is a 
general assumption that minors are unable to make sound judgments 
regarding their medical treatment decisions, but there will be situations 
where the general assumption is inapplicable.143  Wisconsin recognizes 
the general assumption of minor incapacity in the medical treatment 
context,144 but to this point it has failed to provide a mechanism to 
provide the recognized constitutional rights in this area when the 
general assumption does not apply.  
2. Religious Liberty 
A case such as Sheila’s also requires a discussion of constitutional 
protections for religious freedom.  In the area of religious freedom, it is 
necessary to lay out the different protections afforded by the federal and 
Wisconsin systems.  The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
guarantees the right to free exercise of religion.145  The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of this freedom has fluctuated throughout 
history.146  In 1879, the Court interpreted the clause to protect religious 
belief only and not religious action.147  Subsequently, the Court moved 
from this narrow interpretation and extended protection to actions 
 
142.  See supra Part II. 
143.  Parham, 442 U.S. at 603, 620. 
144.  See WIS. STAT. § 48.979 (2013–2014) (describing the ability for a parent to delegate 
power “regarding the care and custody” of a child); supra note 36. 
145.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
146.  The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the clause narrowly, Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–67 (1879) (interpreting the Free Exercise Clause to protect religious 
beliefs but not actions), moved to a more broad interpretation, as in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (protecting proselytizing), Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–09 (protecting an 
employee for refusing to work during Sabbath), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
(limiting compulsory education of children in the Amish community), then back to a more 
narrow interpretation in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that 
laws that act to restrict free exercise are allowable as long as the law is neutral as to religion 
and applicable to the general public). 
147.  Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166–67 (“Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary 
because of his religious belief?  To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become 
a law unto himself.  Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.”). 
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based on religious convictions such as proselytizing,148 refusing to work 
during Sabbath,149 and compulsory education of children.150  These 
decisions established a test commonly described as the Sherbert-Yoder 
test by which a state action that interferes with the free exercise of 
religious liberty must be justified by a sufficiently compelling state 
interest.151  The Sherbert-Yoder balancing test was the settled law until 
1990.152  That year the Court decided Employment Division v. Smith.153  
In Smith, the Court held that if a law is general in nature and is neutral 
to religion, the Free Exercise Clause is not implicated.154  The Court 
distinguished the cases that applied the compelling interest balancing 
test by classifying them as “hybrid” cases in which the free exercise 
claim was connected with other constitutional protections.155  The effect 
of Smith is clear: Laws that impair the free exercise of religion will be 
subject to heightened scrutiny (proof of a compelling state interest) if 
the challenged law specifically targets religious practices or implicates 
 
148.  Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310 (“To persuade others to his own point of view, the 
pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, 
or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement.  But the people of this 
nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and 
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct 
on the part of the citizens of a democracy.”). 
149.  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“For the Free Exercise Clause 
is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual . . . .”). 
150.  Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223–24 (“There can be no assumption that today’s majority is 
‘right’ and the Amish and others like them are ‘wrong.’  A way of life that is odd or even 
erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is 
different.”). 
151.  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (“We must next consider whether some compelling state 
interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the 
substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right.  It is basic that no showing 
merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice[] in this highly 
sensitive constitutional area . . . .”). 
152.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990). 
153.  494 U.S. 872. 
154.  Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 
451 (1988)) (“We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with 
the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges.  The 
government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, 
like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the 
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’”). 
155.  Id. at 881–82 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated 
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections . . . .”). 
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other constitutional rights.156 
In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom and Restoration 
Act (RFRA) criticizing the Smith decision and reinstating the Sherbert-
Yoder balancing test for laws that burden the free exercise of religion.157  
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court once again had its say and refused to 
apply RFRA to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.158  
Congress’s best efforts notwithstanding, the Court’s decision in Smith 
still stands as the controlling authority for Free Exercise claims under 
the First Amendment.159 
Article I, section 18 of the Wisconsin constitution embodies the right 
of religious liberty for Wisconsinites.160  Multiple annotations to article I, 
section 18 show that the constitutional religious freedom protections in 
Wisconsin are intended to be greater than the protections provided by 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.161  A 
representative annotation is illustrative: “Freedom of conscience as 
guaranteed by the Wisconsin constitution is not constrained by the 
boundaries of protection set by the U.S. Supreme Court for the federal 
provision.”162  As robust as the Wisconsin constitutional rights are 
concerning religious liberty, the state is considering amending article I, 
 
156.  Id. at 882–90. 
157.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, 
§ 2(b)(1), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012)) (stating that the purpose 
of the law is “to restore the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its application in all 
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”). 
158.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Broad as the power of 
Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA 
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal 
balance.”). 
159.  See Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 
160.  See WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
161.  WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 annot. (“Freedom of conscience as guaranteed by the 
Wisconsin constitution is not constrained by the boundaries of protection set by the U.S. 
Supreme Court for the federal provision.” (citing State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 56, 65–66, 549 
N.W.2d 235, 239 (1996))); id. (“The Wisconsin Constitution offers more expansive protections 
for freedom of conscience than those offered by the 1st amendment.  When an individual 
makes a claim that state law violates his or her freedom of conscience, courts apply the 
compelling state interest/least restrictive alternative test, requiring the challenger to prove 
that he or she has a sincerely held religious belief that is burdened by application of the state 
law at issue.  Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the law is 
based in a compelling state interest that cannot be served by a less restrictive alternative.” 
(citing Noesen v. Wis. Dep’t of Regulation & Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Bd., 2008 WI 
App 52, ¶ 25, 311 Wis. 2d 237, 751 N.W.2d 385)). 
162.  Id. (citing Miller, 202 Wis. 2d at 65–66). 
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section 18 to provide even more religious liberty protection.163  
Wisconsin’s supreme court has likewise sought to differentiate itself 
from its federal counterpart regarding the free exercise of religion.  In 
State v. Miller, the court pushed back against the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Smith and went so far as to “disavow” the lower court’s 
conclusion that Wisconsin should interpret article I, section 18 as the 
federal courts construe the Free Exercise Clause in the First 
Amendment.164  To further distance Wisconsin from the holding in 
Smith, the court continued, “[O]ur analysis of the freedom of conscious 
as guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution is not constrained by the 
boundaries of protection the United States Supreme Court has set for 
the federal provision.”165  Applying the Wisconsin constitution, the court 
held the compelling interest/least restrictive alternative test repudiated 
by Smith to be the “time-tested standard” for application in freedom of 
conscious matters.166   
Wisconsin’s constitution, legislature, and supreme court have made 
clear that Wisconsin grants greater religious liberty protection than the 
federal government167 and that the caveats placed on Free Exercise 
protection by Smith do not apply in Wisconsin.168 
As applied to a situation like Sheila’s, her constitutional rights were 
violated when her sincere religious beliefs were disregarded and she was 
not allowed to refuse a blood transfusion.169  Even under the more 
restrictive federal regime, denying a minor the opportunity to freely 
exercise her religion in the context of refusing medical treatment is a 
violation of the U.S. Constitution.  While the law requiring parental 
consent for medical treatment would be considered neutral to religion 
and generally applicable to the population as a whole,170 a case in which 
 
163.  Alexander Podkul, Wisconsin Is About to Change How It Deals With Religion—
And It's About Time, POL’Y MIC (August 29, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/61553/
Wisconsin-is-about-to-change-how-it-deals-with-religion-and-it-s-about-time, archived at http:
//perma.cc/NCE8-NFSU. 
164.  Miller, 202 Wis. 2d at 63.  
165.  Id. at 65–66. 
166.  Id. at 69. 
167.  See Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 2009 WI 88, ¶¶ 59–
60, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868. 
168.  See WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 18; Miller, 202 Wis. 2d at 65–66 (noting that in the area of 
freedom of religion, Wisconsin is not constrained by the protections set forth in the U.S. 
Constitution).  
169.  See Sheila W., 2013 WI 63, ¶¶ 14–15, 348 Wis. 2d 674, 835 N.W.2d 148. 
170.  See supra note 144.  The statute and developed common law are generally 
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a minor refuses medical treatment based on religious grounds would 
place the matter squarely within the “hybrid” case exception allowed by 
Smith and require the state to produce a compelling justification for 
refusing to respect the minor’s wishes.171  As discussed above, denial of 
the right to make one’s own medical treatment decisions is a violation of 
due process,172 and under Smith, when the free exercise of religion is also 
implicated, the “hybrid” violation of multiple constitutional rights may 
result in a finding that the Free Exercise Clause has been violated.173  
Under Smith, denying a mature minor the right to determine and 
consent to medical treatment on religious grounds could violate the Free 
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  
If a minor’s refusal of medical treatment on religious grounds 
violates the U.S. Constitution, it is certain that it will also violate the 
Wisconsin Constitution due to Wisconsin granting superior protection in 
the area of religious liberty.174  Wisconsin courts have yet to speak to this 
issue, but there is evidence from a similarly situated state that the 
proposition is accurate.  Like Wisconsin courts recognizing heightened 
protections under the state constitution, Illinois enacted a religious 
freedom statute that reinstated the compelling interest standard for 
religious freedom violations and repudiated the decision in Smith that 
restrained religious liberty.175  It can be said that, like Wisconsin, Illinois 
chose to provide its citizens with religious liberty protections beyond 
those afforded by federal law.   
In the case of In re E.G., the Illinois Appellate Court dealt squarely 
with the constitutional aspects of a seventeen-year-old Jehovah’s 
Witness who was suing a hospital for administering a blood transfusion 
contrary to her desires and religious convictions.176  With respect to the 
treatment decision of the minor, the court stated, “Given the paramount 
importance of religious freedom in the history of our nation, we find it 
 
applicable to the population as a whole and are not directed at any particular religion.  
171.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990). 
172.  See supra Part IV.C.1. 
173.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
174.  See supra notes 160–68 and accompanying text. 
175.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. Act No. 90-806, § 10(6), 1998 Ill. Laws 
5015, 5016 (codified at 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/10(a)(6) (West 2011)) (restoring the 
Sherbert-Yoder compelling interest test discarded by the U.S. Supreme Court in Employment 
Division v. Smith). 
176.  In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 287–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989). 
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difficult to consider seriously an argument that such freedom should be 
afforded less protection from government infringement [than] the rights 
at issue in the abortion cases.”177  The court further stated that the 
“appellant had made a mature, independent decision to follow her 
religious beliefs.  This finding obviates any state interest in protecting 
immature minors, . . . [so the] appellant cannot be prevented from 
exercising a constitutional right solely because of her minority.”178  The 
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this decision on other grounds while 
not rejecting the lower court’s constitutional analysis.179 
This decision and reasoning should be enlightening for Wisconsin 
courts.  Wisconsin, like Illinois, has chosen to provide its citizens with 
enhanced religious liberty protections above those offered by the 
federal government.180  One can only assume these protections are 
meant to be more than merely words published in a book.  Courts are in 
no position to favor a particular religion over another181 or pass 
judgment on the religious views on an individual.182  By refusing to 
recognize a sincerely held religious belief as the basis for refusing 
medical treatment, Wisconsin is dangerously close to proclaiming a 
state-sponsored view that the views of the Jehovah’s Witness religion 
are unworthy of protection.  Such an implication in a state that purports 
to go above and beyond the federal government in protecting religious 
freedom is paradoxical.  Illinois has provided an example of what 
enhanced religious protection looks like in application.  If Wisconsin’s 
constitution and case law are to engender the deference and respect 
they are seemingly due, it would further that cause if the public 
protections contained within them were employed with respect to the 
 
177.  Id. at 290. 
178.  Id. at 290–91. 
179.  In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill. 1989).  The court did not speak to the lower 
court’s constitutional analysis “[b]ecause [it found] that a mature minor may exercise a 
common law right to consent to or refuse medical care [and] decline[d] to address the 
constitutional issue.”  Id. 
180.  See supra notes 161–69, 175 and accompanying text. 
181.  Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of 
religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another.”). 
182.  In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ill. 1965) (“Courts . . . have nothing to 
do with determining the reasonableness of the belief.  That is necessarily a matter of 
individual conscience.” (quoting Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 
(S.D. W. Va. 1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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people they are meant to govern. 
V. RECOGNITION OF THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE AS A LOGICAL 
CONCLUSION 
Respecting the decision of a minor to forgo medical treatment, 
especially treatment that will save or extend the minor’s life, seems 
counterintuitive to societal instincts to protect children.  That 
notwithstanding, should society defer to instinctual impulses as the basis 
for governance, a substantial overhaul of settled law would be required.  
Instead, our system of laws and recognized rights are generally the 
byproduct of a thoughtful and deliberate process of judicial decision 
making and legislative action.  Unfortunately, in some instances, certain 
areas of law or individual rights have failed to produce a sufficiently 
reasoned stance in light of all considerations.  A mature minor’s right to 
make her own medical treatment decisions outside of the procreation 
context is a glaring example of legislative and judicial failure to apply an 
even hand to accepted and recognized individual rights. 
In the context of minors making their own medical decisions, the 
current state of Wisconsin law allows for revealing dichotomies: a 
sixteen-year-old can get married and become emancipated, thereby 
attaining the right to make his or her own medical treatment 
decisions,183 but an unmarried minor a single day short of his or her 
eighteenth birthday cannot;184 a minor may be allowed to make medical 
treatment decisions for a child she has given birth to185 but not for 
herself until she reaches the age of eighteen;186 and the rights allowing 
for a minor to procure an abortion are recognized,187 but the same rights 
are denied to minors seeking to make other medical decisions until they 
reach the age of majority.188 
Perhaps such dichotomies are the reason Wisconsin courts have 
refused to address this issue directly—allowing minors to make 
decisions that may result in the end of their life may be exceedingly 
uncomfortable, but a denial of the doctrine is undoubtedly logically 
inconsistent with settled Wisconsin law.  There is no basis or reasonable 
 
183.  See supra note 92.  
184.  See supra note 144. 
185.  See supra note 88. 
186.  See supra note 144. 
187.  See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
188.  See supra note 144. 
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argument to consider a married sixteen-year-old more capable of 
making medical treatment decisions than a minor who has endured 
years of treatment for a particular condition.  A marriage certificate in 
no way, shape, or form confers any functional maturity upon its 
recipient, but in Wisconsin it is treated as a magic ticket to adulthood for 
the purposes of medical treatment decisions.189   
It is equally illogical to confer the right upon a mother under the age 
of majority to make medical treatment decisions for a child she bore 
while withholding the same right as applied to her own body.  The 
curious conclusion we are to draw from this scenario is that the state has 
an interest in protecting the mother from her own immaturity in relation 
to medical treatment decisions, but the same not-mature-enough 
mother’s medical treatment decisions as they relate to her more 
vulnerable child are to be respected.  For Wisconsin to create and 
maintain such curious outcomes is confounding.   
The blatant inconsistencies regarding the recognition of abortion 
rights and willful blindness of the same underlying rights for minors 
seeking to make their own medical treatment decisions have been 
discussed earlier.  However, it is worth highlighting the hypocrisy of this 
reality.  In Wisconsin, a minor that seeks to procure an abortion is 
recognized to have the due process and bodily integrity rights to do so, 
but only if she seeks an abortion.190  These rights simply vanish if the 
medical treatment decision the minor wishes to make is not in one of the 
limited state-approved areas.191  This is so even if the minor, in the 
context of making that decision, is exercising her Free Exercise right.192  
Such a reality exposes the sad truth that, in Wisconsin, more important 
than the right being exercised is the social nature of the act.  Allowing 
mature minors the right to procure an abortion while preventing the 
same mature minors from making other medical decisions, especially 
when religious liberty is implicated, is little more than specious political 
folly clothed as thoughtful jurisprudence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, recognition of the mature minor doctrine in the context 
 
189.  See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
190.  See supra note 95. 
191.  See supra notes 82–91 and accompanying text. 
192.  See supra Part IV.C.2. 
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of medical treatment decisions is neither novel nor rare.  Wisconsin 
currently affords minors adult status in a number of circumstances.193  
While the decisions relating to medical treatment have different 
interests and concerns than most of the other situations where adult 
status is conferred upon minors, these interests have already been found 
to be subservient to the minor’s rights at issue in the context of 
abortion.194  There is no reasonable rationale why such rights should 
exist for minors only in the arena of procreation.  Wisconsin has chosen 
to deny minors like Sheila W. their rights to due process, bodily 
integrity, and freedom of religion.  Wisconsin has maintained this 
duplicitous stance without input from the state’s highest court.  As long 
as this status quo is maintained, Wisconsin is running afoul of the 
existing statutory spirit in the state, accepted common law, scholarly and 
professional authority, the U.S. Constitution, the purported “more 
expansive protections for freedom of conscience than those offered by 
the First Amendment”195 in the Wisconsin Constitution, and common 
sense.  Although it is unlikely the legislature will soon accept the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s invitation to take up the mature minor 
doctrine, one branch of government should have the courage to address 
this pressing issue and extend the already-recognized constitutional 
protections of due process and bodily integrity to minors beyond certain 
politically expedient realms. 
 
LUKE HUDOCK 
 
193.  See supra notes 82–95 and accompanying text. 
194.  See supra Part IV.C. 
195.  See WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18 annot. (citing Noesen v. Wis. Dep’t of Regulation & 
Licensing, Pharmacy Examining Bd., 2008 WI App 52, ¶ 25, 311 Wis. 2d 237, 751 N.W.2d 
385). 
